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JURISDICTION 
This case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
FIRST ISSUE: Did the trial court properly grant Washington Mutual's self-
styled "Motion to Dismiss" under a summary judgment standard, as permitted by Rule 
12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, when Pett failed to dispute any of the 
material facts offered in support of Washington Mutual9 s motion? 
Standard of Review. In reviewing atrial court's grant of summary judgment, "we 
consider only whether [it] correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no 
disputed issues of material fact existed." Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., 
Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998). 
Preservation of the Issue: Washington Mutual submitted a self-styled "Motion 
to Dismiss" under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See R. at 53. Despite 
the title of the document, Washington Mutual5 s supporting memorandum was 
accompanied by copies of documentary evidence, with respect to which Appellant Pett 
neither objected nor raised any factual disputes. See R. 56-58. Because Pett did not 
object to the documentary evidence, the only issue properly before the Court is whether 
summary judgment was properly rendered under Rule 56, as permitted when documents 
1 
outside the pleadings are "presented to and not excluded by the court" pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6). See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). 
SECOND ISSUE: Did the trial court properly disqualify Pett's counsel, Charles 
Schultz, after Schultz submitted his own affidavit testimony that directly contradicted 
affidavit testimony by a witness for Washington Mutual? 
Standard of Review: "The proper standard of review for decisions relating to 
disqualification is abuse of discretion * * * * however . . . to the extent this Court has 
a special interest in administering the law governing attorney ethical rules, a trial court's 
discretion is limited. Houghton v. Department of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998) 
(citations omitted). 
Preservation of the Issue: The issue of attorney disqualification was raised in 
Washington MutuaPs Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs Attorney. See R. at 114. 
THIRD ISSUE: Did the trial court properly determine that Washington Mutual' s 
Memorandum in Opposition to Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed timely 
under applicable court rules, and hence properly deny Pett's Motion to Strike? 
Standard of Review: Whether a litigant's motion is timely filed depends on 
proper construction of the court rule or statute under which the motion was brought. This 
determination presents a question of law. Accordingly, on appeal the Court reviews a 
trial court's denial of the motion on grounds of untimeliness under a correction of error 
standard. In re Doe, 894 P.2d 1285 at 1287 (Utah App. 1995). 
2 
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 AAw v*wwcrminative statutes and court rules pertinent to this appeal are lengthy, and 
have been provided in the Addendum, to this Brief, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of'thc Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
' ' ' S I ATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a case which should never have been hied. I 'ollowing an acrimonious 
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nothing from a bank she disliked. Even though the bank timely provided her with a 
package of documents which contained everything she needed to release the bank's deed 
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of trust lien, and even though her failure to utilize these documents until several months 
later caused her no monetary damages whatsoever, she still filed the lawsuit at hand. 
The lawsuit is based upon a misunderstanding of Utah Code Ann. §57-1-38(3), 
and the ignoring of §57-1-38(4). When the lawsuit was filed on September 13, 2002, 
Pett believed that if a bank did not record a deed of reconveyance within ninety (90) days 
of final payment it was strictly liable to pay the borrower $ 1,000.00 plus attorney's fees 
incurred in enforcing the statute, even when no damages were incurred. This 
unfortunate misconstruction of the law has now cost the parties involved a great deal of 
time and money and the judicial system a great deal of time. 
Although there are numerous "red herrings" which invite the Court down 
unproductive paths, the Court's attention is best focused upon §57-1-38(3) and (4) and 
whether the uncontested facts establish compliance with that statute. If they do, the trial 
court acted properly in granting summary judgment. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1 -3 8(3) provides that a secured lender who fails to "release" 
a security interest on a secured loan within ninety (90) days of final payment is liable to 
the owner for the greater of either (a) one thousand dollars; or (b) treble actual damages 
incurred as a result of the failure to release the security interest The statute also entitles 
the owner to recover reasonable attorney's fees and court costs. 
Subsection (4) of the statute, however, establishes a defense to this liability which 
the trial court held to be controlling in this case. Subsection (4) provides that a lender 
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Course of Proceedings 
On September 13,2002,9 Pett filed a Complaint against Washington Mutual based 
upon her aLv cuiiwi, il...; .«....., . * • in 
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certain real property (hereinafter, the "Property") jointly owned by her and her brother 
Robert, after they had made a stipulated payment in full satisfaction of their mortgage 
loan. See R. at 8-12. Specifically, Pett alleged that Washington Mutual was in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3), which provides that a secured lender who fails to 
"release" a security interest on a secured loan within ninety (90) days of final payment 
is liable to the owner or titleholder for the greater of either: (a) one Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00); or (b) treble actual damages incurred as a result of the failure to release the 
security interest. See Utah Code Ann. § 57~l-38(3)(a). The statute also entitles the 
owner or titleholder to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. See id. at 
subsection (b). 
Although Pett prayed, in her Complaint, for actual damages under the statute {see 
R. at 15), she did not specifically describe any basis for an award of actual damages. 
Furthermore, Pett's allegation that Washington Mutual had failed to release its security 
interest in the Property was false, because the Property had been fully reconveyed to Pett 
and her brother Robert (collectively hereinafter, the "Petts") on August 19,2002, some 
26 days before the filing of the Complaint. See R. at 68. 
Washington Mutual answered Pett's Complaint with a pleading entitled "Motion 
to Dismiss." See R. at 53. In a supporting memorandum, Washington Mutual agreed 
that, on November 20, 2001, Pett had paid Washington Mutual $56,629.91 in full 
settlement of a previous action regarding Pett's obligation under a note and trust deed 
6 
(hereinafter, the "Trust Deed"). See R. at 57. Washington Mutual asserted, however, 
that on January 8, 2002, its counsel had shipped all documents necessary to effect a 
reconveyance to Pett via UPS next-day air delivery. See id. In support of this assertion, 
Washington Mutual offered copies of all the reconveyance documents provided to the 
Petts, and a copy of the UPS shipping label and associated tracking report, showing that 
a package from counsel had indeed been delivered to the Property on January 9,2002. 
SeeR. at 61-67. 
Washington Mutual also asserted that Phillips-Hansen Land Title Company, the 
trustee of the Trust Deed, had reconveyed the Property to the Petts on August 19,2002. 
See R. at 58. A copy of a Full Reconveyance on file with the Box Elder County 
Recorder was attached to the Motion to Dismiss. See R. at 68. On the basis of the Full 
Reconveyance, Washington Mutual asserted that there was no basis for Pett's 
contention, in her Complaint, that the Property had not been reconveyed. See R. at 58. 
Washington Mutual further asserted that "the documents for reconveyance were 
provided to Plaintiff in a timely manner, therefore WMB is not liable for statutory or 
punitive damages.95 See R. at 59. 
Pett did not dispute any of the facts presented in Washington Mutual's Motion 
to Dismiss. See R. at 86-87 (Statement of Facts offered in Pett's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss). Instead, Pett argued that Washington Mutual was 
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required, by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3), "to file a reconveyance within 90 says of the 
date Ms. Pett fully paid the trust deed note to defendants." See R. at 88. 
Before a decision was rendered on Washington Mutual's Motion to Dismiss, Pett 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. at 94. In her Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Pett argued that there were no issues of material fact, and that "the only issue 
for the Court to decide in this case is, as a matter of law, are the defendants required to 
actually file a reconveyance or can they satisfy the express provisions of UCA § 57-1-
33.1, UCA § 57-1-38(3) and UCA § 57-1-38(4) by simply sending documents to a 
trustor and telling them to have them filled-out and recorded at the trustor's expense if 
the trustors want title to their property reconveyed." See R. at 95. Pett attached to her 
Motion for Summary Judgment a copy of her written request, "pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-33.1(1)," that Washington Mutual reconvey her property.1 See R. at 110. 
In response to Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment, Washington Mutual filed 
a Memorandum in Opposition, and the Affidavit of Judy Jorgensen. See R. at 116 and 
144. Jorgensen had previously represented Washington Mutual in another lawsuit 
brought by the Petts regarding the proper crediting of the Petts' payments under the 
Trust Deed and note. See R. at 145. In her Affidavit, Jorgensen testified that the Petts' 
i 
Pett was evidently confused, because the "written request" contemplated by the 
statute is not the trustor's (in this case, Pett's) request. Instead, the request is made by the 
beneficiary of the deed of trust (in this case, Washington Mutual) and tendered to the trustee 
of the deed of trust. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33.1. The trustee (in this case, Phillips-
Hansen Land Title Company) is then obligated to perform the reconveyance. 
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attorney, Charles Schultz (hereinafter, "Schultz"), had insisted that she reconvey the 
Property to the Petts immediately upon the Petts' tender of a stipulated sum in full 
satisfaction of the Trust Deed and note. See R. at 144-45. Jorgensen testified that she 
explained to Schultz that, because no one in her law firm was the trustee of the Trust 
Deed, she had no control over the timing of the reconveyance of the Property. See R. 
at 145-46. Jorgensen testified that, upon Schultz's request, she had agreed "to obtain 
a request for reconveyance and substitution of trustee from Washington Mutual as soon 
as reasonably possible, and to forward those documents to the Petts directly." See R. at 
146. 
On December 18, 2002, the same day that Washington Mutual filed its 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Washington 
Mutual also filed a Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs Attorney. See R. at 137. The gist 
of the argument provided in connection with Washington Mutual's Motion to Disqualify 
was that, because Jorgensen had alleged an agreement with Schultz regarding the 
handling of the reconveyance documents, Schultz was likely to be a material witness in 
the case. See R. at 114. Washington Mutual reasoned that, whether it had established 
a reasonable procedure for releasing its security interest in the Property (which would 
be a defense to Petf s claim pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §57-1-3 8(4)), depended in part 
on whether Schultz and Jorgensen had actually agreed that Jorgensen should send the 
9 
reconveyance documents directly to the Petts. See Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Disqualify Plaintiffs Attorney at R. 139-41. 
Schultz responded by filing his own affidavit, in which he testified that 
"Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Jorgensen's Affidavit are blatant lies." See R. at 176 
(paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Jorgensen Affidavit, at R. 146, specifically state the terms 
of the alleged agreement). In his affidavit, Schultz repeatedly made the conclusory 
assertion that "Jorgensen is a liar" to support his allegation that he never entered the 
agreement alleged by Jorgensen. See R. 177, paragraphs nos. 11 and 13, and R. 178, 
paragraph 14. 
On December 19, 2002, one day after the filing of Washington Mutual's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Pett filed a 
Motion to Strike. See R. at 162. In her Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, 
Pett claimed that Washington Mutual's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment was not timely filed in accordance with the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure or the Code of Judicial Administration, and that it should therefore 
be stricken. See R. at 164. 
Washington Mutual opposed the Motion to Strike by pointing out that, under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 6(a), when a prescribed period for a response is less than eleven days, 
intervening Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded from the computation. 
See R. at 185. Pett had simply counted ten consecutive days. See R. at 163-164. 
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Washington Mutual contended, therefore, that when the time for response was properly 
calculated under the applicable rules, its opposition memorandum was actually filed one 
day prior to the deadline. See R. at 186. 
Disposition of the Case by the Trial Court 
The trial court first addressed the Motion to Strike. See R. at 268-69. The trial 
court held that under the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration and the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Washington Mutual's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion 
for Summary Judgment would have been timely if filed with the court by December 19, 
2002. See R. at 269. Because it was filed on December 18,2002, the trial court denied 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. See id 
The trial court granted Washington Mutual's Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs 
attorney. See R. at 271. The court observed that "Defendant alleges certain agreements 
between Mr. Shultz and Attorney Jorgensen that, if made, establish a defense under the 
statue [sic], and may require granting a motion to dismiss. Mr. Schultz attached an 
affidavit to his memorandum [in which he] recites various allegations of dishonesty 
on the part of Jorgensen to essentially dispute the arrangement Jorgensen alleges was 
made between them. This goes to prove Defendant's point that he is a material witness 
in this case " See R. at 271. 
Finally, the trial court granted Washington Mutual's Motion to Dismiss. See R. 
at 274. It held that, under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3), Washington Mutual had no 
11 
obligation to "reconvey" the Property, but rather, only to "release" its security interest 
within 90 days after final payment of the loan. See R. at 273. The trial court reasoned 
that Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(4) provided a defense to Pett's claim because "a 
reasonable procedure was established to release the security interest in a timely manner, 
the procedure was followed in good faith, and the reconveyance of the subject deed 
beyond 90 days was not the fault of the Defendant, the documents were sent and after 
that were in the control of the Plaintiff." See R. at 275. 
Statement of Facts 
In granting the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court relied upon the following facts 
(see R. 274), which were supported by documentary evidence in the record, and not 
subject to any dispute by the parties: 
(a) Pett paid off her loan on the Property on November 20,2001, as stipulated in 
case number 990100647. See R. at 18,20, and 57. 
(b) Pett sent Washington Mutual a written demand for a reconveyance. See R. 
at 110. 
(c) Washington Mutual gathered the documents necessary to reconvey the 
Property and sent them to local counsel, Lundberg & Associates. See R. at 57 and 
61-68. 
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(d) Lundberg & Associates shipped the documents to Pett on January 8,2002, and 
they arrived on Pett's porch on January 9,2002, fifty days after Pett paid off her loan in 
full. See R. at 57 and 65. 
(e) a document entitled "Full Reconveyance" was recorded in Box Elder County 
on August 19, 2002. See R. at 58 and 68. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
First, the trial court properly granted Washington Mutual's self-styled "Motion 
to Dismiss" under a summary judgment standard, as permitted by Rule 12(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure because Pett failed to dispute any of the material facts offered 
in support of Washington Mutual's motion. Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that "If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss 
for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56." 
While the trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, purported to grant 
Washington Mutual's Motion to Dismiss as a 12(b)(6) motion, it actually applied a 
summary judgment standard in making its ruling because it relied upon undisputed 
matters presented outside the pleadings. Because Pett failed to dispute any of those 
13 
matters in her response to Washington Mutual's Motion to dismiss, and because it is 
apparent from the record that they were not subject to any dispute, the trial court 
properly applied the law to the undisputed facts as provided for in Rule 56 of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Next, the trial court properly disqualified Pett's counsel, Charles Schultz, after 
Schultz submitted his own affidavit testimony that directly contradicted affidavit 
testimony by a witness for Washington Mutual. Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct provides that an attorney shall not act as an advocate in a trial in which he is 
likely to be a necessary witness. Because Schultz submitted an affidavit to dispute 
whether an agreement regarding the handling of the reconveyance of the Pett Trust Deed 
had been reached between himself and an attorney who represented Washington Mutual 
in a prior case, he invited a credibility contest between himself and a witness for 
Washington Mutual. The only way the trial court could have resolved the dispute would 
have been to hear the testimony of Schultz and the Washington Mutual witness. Schultz 
was therefore properly disqualified because his testimony would have been necessary 
to resolve the dispute. Of course, if the Court sustains the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment, it renders the issue of the removal of Pett's attorney moot. 
Finally, the trial court properly denied Pett's Motion to Strike because 
Washington Mutual's Memorandum in Opposition to Pett's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed within the ten days allowed by Rule 4-501 and Rule 6 of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Pett claimed that Washington Mutual's 
memorandum was not timely filed, it is apparent that Pett failed to consider that, when 
calculating any period of less than eleven days, intervening weekends are not considered 
in counting the prescribed period. Furthermore, Pett failed to consider that because her 
Motion for Summary Judgment was served by mail, Washington Mutual had an extra 
three days to respond under Rule 6. Applying both principles, the trial court properly 
concluded that Washington Mutual's memorandum was timely filed. Furthermore, Pett 
appears to have withdrawn this third claim from the appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Because the Trial Court Properly Applied a Summary Judgment 
Standard to the Undisputed Facts of the Case, Its Grant of 
Washington Mutual's Motion to Dismiss Should Be Affirmed 
The trial court properly applied a summary judgment standard in granting 
Washington Mutual's Motion to Dismiss because it considered only undisputed matters, 
including matters outside the pleadings, that were properly supported by the record. 
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "If, on a motion asserting 
the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity 
to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." See Utah R. Civ. 
15 
P. Rule 12(b). See also DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 
1996). 
In DOIT, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case as a motion for summary 
judgment even though the trial court's order purported to grant a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court noted that "[w]hen 
affidavits or other evidence is presented in conjunction with a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6) and the court does not exclude them, the motion is generally treated as a 
motion for summary judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. * * * * This 
treatment is especially proper in the instant case where all parties submitted extraneous 
materials and neither plaintiffs nor defendants are prejudiced. Accordingly, defendants1 
motions and the trial court's order are properly viewed as summary judgment 
proceedings." See DOIT, 926 P.2d at 838 n.3 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
As in DOIT, the trial court in this case purported to grant a motion to dismiss 
even though it considered matters outside the pleadings. Therefore, the trial court 
actually granted a motion for summary judgment as permitted by Rule 12(b). Because 
Pett has not challenged the legal conclusions of the trial court, the only question before 
the Court is whether the trial court "correctly concluded that no disputed issues of 
material fact existed." See Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 
1273, 1277 (Utah 1998). 
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A. The Only Facts Considered By the Trial Court Were 
Undisputed and Supported by the Record 
When considering a motion for summary judgment, "all material facts set forth 
in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record 
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement." See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-
501(2)(B)(2003). Because the facts upon which the trial court relied were supported by 
the record, and because Pett failed to dispute those facts below, the trial court properly 
rendered summary judgment as a matter of law. 
In granting the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court relied upon the following facts, 
which were set forth in the Motion and supported by the record : 
(A) "on November 21, the Plaintiff delivered a cashiers check to Defendant's 
attorney as payment in full on certain property." See R. at 274. This fact was set forth 
in Washington Mutual's Motion to Dismiss ( R. at 57) and supported by Exhibit "A" of 
Pett's own Complaint (R. 18). 
(B) 'This payment was made as part of a stipulated settlement of case number 
990100647." SeeR. at 274. This fact was set forth in Washington Mutual's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. at 57) and supported by Exhibit "A" of Pett's own Complaint (R. 18). 
(C) "Defendant gathered the paperwork necessary to have the deed reconveyed 
to Plaintiff, and sent these documents to Defendant's attorney handling the matter 
(Lundberg & Associates)." See R. at 274. This fact was set forth in Washington 
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Mutual's Motion to Dismiss (R. at 57) and supported by Exhibits "A" through "D" of 
the Motion (R. 61-65). 
(D) "Lundberg sent these documents to Plaintiff via UPS on January 8, 2002." 
See R. at 274. This fact was set forth in Washington Mutual's Motion (R. at 57) and 
supported by Exhibit "D" of the Motion. 
(E) "The documents were delivered to Plaintiff s porch on January 9,2002." See 
R. at 274. This fact was set forth in Washington Mutual's Motion ( R. at 57) and 
supported by Exhibit "E" of the Motion. 
(F) "These documents were sent to Plaintiff 50 days after receiving payment in 
full." This fact was set forth in Washington Mutual's Motion (R. 58) and was subject 
to judicial notice by the use of a reliable calendar. See R. at 274 and Utah R. Evid. 
201(b). 
(G) "A document entitled 'Full Reconveyance' was recorded in Box Elder 
County, Utah on August 19, 2002." This fact was set forth in Washington Mutual's 
Motion ( R. at 58) and supported by Exhibit "F" of the Motion. 
Applying Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(4) to these facts, the trial court held that "a 
reasonable procedure was established to release the security interest in a timely manner, 
the procedure was followed in good faith, and the reconveyance of the subject deed 
beyond 90 days was not the fault of the Defendant." See R. at 275 (footnotes omitted). 
On this basis, the trial court granted Washington Mutual's Motion to Dismiss. 
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B. Because Pett Did Not Dispute the Facts Below, She Is Barred 
From Disputing Them on Appeal 
Pett now improperly attempts to dispute some of the facts upon which the trial 
court relied in granting summary judgment, although she never raised any such disputes 
before the trial court. This is impermissible. "When there is no indication in the record 
on appeal that the trial court reached or ruled on an issue, this court will not undertake 
to consider the issue on appeal/' See Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198,201 (Utah Ct App. 
1989). 
Even though Pett never disputed, below, that the reconveyance documents were 
sent to her, or that they reached her on January 9,2002, she now claims for the first time 
on appeal that the record does not support such facts. See Appellant's Brief at 14. Pett 
does not even cite to the record to support her contention. She apparently relies upon 
the fact that Exhibits "A" and "D" of the Motion to Dismiss show that the reconveyance 
documents were addressed to her brother, "Robert Jensen Pett" rather than to her. See 
R. at 61 and 65. 
Nevertheless, the documents were addressed to 224 West 700 South, in Brigham 
City, Utah. See id. This is the same address that Pett herself used on her own Complaint 
(R. 16), on her civil coversheet (R. 27), and on her own letterhead when she requested 
a reconveyance from Washington Mutual (R. 110). Furthermore, Pett and her brother 
were joint trustors under the Trust Deed. See R. at 68. Pett's argument that the 
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reconveyance documents were never sent to her is both improperly raised for the first 
time on appeal and factually incorrect. 
Pett also disputes, for the first time on appeal, that the reconveyance documents 
arrived on her porch. See Appellant's Brief at 14. Washington Mutual has searched the 
record in vain to find anything that shows that Pett disputed this fact below. Pett's bare 
contention raised for the first time on appeal should not be considered by the Court. 
Finally, Pett disputes the trial court's purported "factual findings" that (1) 
Washington Mutual established a reasonable procedure to release its security interest in 
a timely manner; (2) that the procedure was followed in good faith; (3) that it was not 
the fault of Washington Mutual that the property was reconveyed beyond the 90 days 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3); and (4) that she was in control of the 
reconveyance documents after Washington Mutual sent them. See Appellant's Brief at 
15. 
The first two points are actually applications of law to undisputed facts rather 
than, as Pett contends, facts that were subject to dispute before the trial court. Points (3) 
and (4) are merely inescapable logical inferences that follow from the undisputed facts: 
namely, that the reconveyance documents were delivered to the Property, on January 9, 
2002, and that the reconveyance was actually accomplished by Pett or someone acting 
on her behalf. 
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Because Pett did not dispute the facts presented in Washington Mutual's Motion 
to Dismiss, and because such facts were properly supported by the record, the trial court 
appropriately granted judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b), Utah R. Civ. P. 56 and Utah 
R. Jud. Admin. 4-501. Pett cannot, for the first time on appeal, dispute facts that she 
was obligated to dispute below. The trial court's judgment should therefore be affirmed. 
Furthermore, if the Court of Appeals determines that the undisputed facts 
presented to the trial court do justify the grant of summary judgment, then the entire 
appeal will have been resolved. If summary judgment was properly granted, it makes 
no difference whether Pett's attorney was properly disqualified concurrently with the 
granting of summary judgment. If the trial court was correct that summary judgment is 
supported by the undisputed facts, it does not matter whether the opposition to Pett's 
motion for summary judgment was timely served upon Pett. 
As a consequence of the foregoing, Pett's failure to dispute any material facts 
upon which the trial court based its ruling constitutes the failure of Pett's entire appeal. 
II. The Disqualification of Pett's Attorney Was Proper Under the Rules 
of Professional Conduct Because He Submitted Affidavit Testimony 
Regarding a Disputed Fact 
Pett argues that the trial court improperly disqualified her attorney, Schultz, 
because it failed to make a determination that a purported conversation between Schultz 
and Jorgensen, during which Jorgensen agreed to send the reconveyance documents 
directly to Pett, actually took place. See Appellant's Brief at 18. Ironically, Pett's 
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argument supports, rather than detracts from, the trial court's decision. Pett fails to 
realize that a determination of whether the conversation ever took place would require 
live testimony from both Schultz and Jorgensen in order for the court to evaluate the 
credibility of the witnesses. Because Schultz would have had to provide his own 
testimony in order for the court to make such a determination, the trial court properly 
disqualified him. 
Furthermore, by submitting his own affidavit regarding a disputed fact before the 
court, Schultz already provided adequate grounds for his disqualification. See Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct, R.3.7(a)(l)-(3); Watkiss & Campbell v Foa & Son, 808 
P .2d 1061 (Utah 1991) (holding that attorney who offered affidavit testimony in support 
of his client's opposition to a motion for summary judgment should have been 
disqualified). 
Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (the "RPC") provides that a lawyer 
shall not act as an advocate at trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary 
witness. The rule provides for exceptions in only three instances: (1) where the 
testimony relates to an undisputed issue; (2) where the testimony relates to the nature and 
value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) where the disqualification of the 
lawyer would be cause substantial hardship to the client. See RPC 3.7(a)(l)-(3). 
Schultz was not merely likely to be a witness in the case. He in fact made himself 
a witness by submitting an affidavit to the court to support Pett's Memorandum in 
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Opposition to Motion to Disqualify. See R. 176. In his affidavit, Schultz testified that 
"Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Jorgensen's Affidavit are blatant lies." See R. at 176 
(paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Jorgensen Affidavit, at R. 146, specifically state the terms 
of the agreement, the existence of which was disputed by Schultz). By repeatedly 
making the conclusory assertion that "Jorgensen is a liar" to support his allegation that 
he never entered the agreement, Schultz invited a credibility contest between himself and 
Jorgensen. See R. 177, paragraphs nos. 11 and 13, and R. 178, paragraph 14. 
Schultz's affidavit testimony did not relate to an undisputed issue, or to the nature 
and value of legal services rendered in the case. Further, Pett never alleged that 
Schultz's disqualification would cause her substantial hardship. Therefore, Schultz's 
disqualification was proper under R.3.7(a)(l)-(3) of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
III. The Trial Court's Denial of Pett's Motion to Strike Should Be 
Affirmed Because Washington MutuaPs Opposition Memorandum 
Was Filed Within the Ten Days Required By R 4-501 of the Rules of 
Judicial Administration 
At the outset it should be noted that Pett has probably withdrawn her third 
argument on appeal. Although not entirely clear, Pett's brief states: "Ms. Pett, therefore, 
respectfully dismiss [sic] her claim with respect to her claim for denial of her motion to 
strike." See Appellant Brief, p. 20. 
In the event that Washington Mutual has misunderstood the above language, it 
hereby submits its response to the substance of the argument: An analysis of the relevant 
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dates under Rule 6 shows that Washington Mutual's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed within the ten days required by R4-
501 (1 )(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Because it was filed timely, the 
trial court properly denied Pett's Motion to Strike. See Utah R. Civ. P. 6(a) and (e). 
Under Rule 6, the day of an act from which a prescribed period of time begins to 
run is not counted in computing the time for filing a responsive pleading or motion. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(a). Further, if the last day of such period falls upon a Saturday, 
Sunday, or legal holiday, then the end of the period is extended until the next day that 
is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. See id. Rule 6 also provides that if the 
prescribed period is less than eleven days, intervening Saturdays, Sundays, and legal 
holidays shall be excluded from the computation. See id. Finally, when a motion or 
pleading is served by mail, three extra days are added to the prescribed period for a 
response. See Utah R. Civ. P. 6(e). 
Turning to the facts of this case, there can be no dispute that Washington 
MutuaPs Opposition Memorandum was filed timely. On December 2, 2002, Pett filed 
her Motion for Summary Judgment and her accompanying Memorandum with the Court 
and served both on Washington Mutual by mail. See R. at 93-94 and 102. On 
December 18,2002, Washington Mutual filed its Memorandum in Opposition. See R. 
at 116. 
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Rule 6 provides that the first day of this prescribed ten day period began on 
December 3. Because the prescribed period was less than eleven days, the Rule provides 
that intervening weekends are not counted in calculating this period. Excluding 
weekends, the tenth day of the prescribed period was therefore December 16,2002. The 
analysis does not end here, however, because Pett's Motion and Memorandum were 
served by mail. See R. at 102. Because Pett served her Motion and Memorandum by 
mail, Washington Mutual was entitled, under Utah R. Civ. P. 6(e), to three extra days 
before it was required to file its Opposition Memorandum. There can be no argument, 
then, that Washington Mutual's filing of its Opposition Memorandum with the Court 
would have been timely if accomplished on any day up to and including December 19, 
2002. 
Because Washington Mutual's Opposition Memorandum was filed with the Court 
on December 18, 2002, Pett's Motion to Strike was wholly without merit and was 
properly denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decisions should be affirmed in all respects. First, Pett failed to 
raise any factual disputes in her Memorandum in Opposition to Washington Mutual's 
Motion to dismiss. Because matters outside the pleadings were considered, the Motion 
to Dismiss was converted to a motion for summary judgment. Because Pett failed to 
raise any disputes of material fact below, she is now precluded from raising any such 
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disputes on appeal. Second, Pett's attorney violated Rule 3.7 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct by submitting his own affidavit testimony to dispute the testimony 
of a witness for Washington Mutual. He was therefore properly disqualified. Third, 
there is no basis, under the Rules of Civil Procedure or the Rules of Judicial 
Administration, for Pett's contention that Washington Mutual's Memorandum in 
Opposition to her Motion for Summary Judgment was filed untimely. The trial court 
therefore properly denied her Motion to Strike. 
Respectfully submitted this *\ day of December, 2003. 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Marlon L. Bates 
William G. Wilson 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES was served upon counsel of record at the addresses listed below by 
depositing the same in the United States mail, postage pre-paid on this T day of 
December, 2003. 
Filia (Phil) H. Uipi 
313 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Charles A. Schultz 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
I 
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Addenda 
57-1-38. Release of security interest. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Secured lender" means: 
(i) a mortgagee on a mortgage; 
(ii) a beneficiary on a trust deed; 
(iii) a person that holds or retains legal title to real property as security for financing the 
purchase of the real property under a real estate sales contract; and 
(iv) any other person that holds or retains a security interest in real property to secure the 
repayment of a secured loan. 
(b) (i) "Secured loan" means a loan or extension of credit, the repayment of which is 
secured by a mortgage, a trust deed, the holding or retention of legal title under a real 
estate sales contract, or other security interest in real property, whether or not the security 
interest is perfected. 
(ii) A judgment award secured by a judgment lien is not of itself a secured loan. A 
subsequent written agreement between a judgment creditor and a judgment debtor 
concerning payment of the judgment is a secured loan if it otherwise qualifies under the 
definition in Subsection (l)(b)(i). 
(c) "Security interest" means an interest in real property that secures payment or 
performance of an obligation. Security interest includes a lien or encumbrance. 
(d) "Servicer" means a person that services and receives loan payments on behalf of a 
secured lender with respect to a secured loan. 
(2) This section may not be interpreted to validate, invalidate, alter, or otherwise affect 
the foreclosure of a mortgage, the exercise of a trustee's power of sale, the exercise of 
a seller's right of reentry under a real estate sales contract, or the exercise of any other 
power or remedy of a secured lender to enforce the repayment of a secured loan. 
(3) A secured lender or servicer who fails to release the security interest on a secured 
loan within 90 days after receipt of the final payment of the loan is liable to another 
secured lender on the real property or the owner or titleholder of the real property for: 
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(a) the greater of $1,000 or treble actual damages incurred because of the failure to 
release the security interest, including all expenses incurred in completing a quiet title 
action; and 
(b) reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. 
(4) A secured lender or servicer is not liable under Subsection (3) if the secured lender 
or servicer: 
(a) has established a reasonable procedure to release the security interest on a secured 
loan in a timely manner after the final payment on the loan; 
(b) has complied with this procedure in good faith; and 
(c) is unable to release the security interest within 90 days after receipt of the final 
payment because of the action or inaction of an agency or other person beyond its direct 
control. 
57-1-33.1.Reconveyance of a trust deed — Erroneous reconveyance. 
(1) (a) When an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the trustee shall, 
upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. 
(b) At the time the beneficiary requests a reconveyance under Subsection (l)(a), the 
beneficiary shall deliver to the trustee or the trustee's successor in interest the trust deed 
and the note or other evidence that the obligation securing the trust deed has been 
satisfied. 
(2) The reconveyance under Subsection (1) may designate the grantee as "the person or 
persons entitled thereto." 
(3) If a reconveyance is erroneously recorded by a beneficiary, the effect of the 
reconveyance may be nullified and the trust deed reinstated by the recording of a 
corrective affidavit executed by the then current beneficiary describing the trust deed and 
setting forth the fact of the erroneous reconveyance. Upon the recording of a corrective 
affidavit or similar instrument, the trust deed has the same priority as it did prior to the 
erroneous reconveyance. However, any lien or interest that was recorded or attached to 
the trust deed property between the time of the recording of the erroneous reconveyance 
and the recording of the corrective affidavit or similar instrument has priority over the 
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reinstated trust deed, unless the lien or interest was recorded or attached with actual 
knowledge that the trust deed had been reconveyed erroneously. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall 
serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete 
within the state and within thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is complete 
outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer 
thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim 
in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, 
within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of 
a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not 
affect the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be 
served within ten days after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the 
pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency 
of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to 
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before 
pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined 
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further 
pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief 
to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may 
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time 
as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by 
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the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided 
in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this 
rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in 
subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, 
unless the court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted 
is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive 
pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive 
pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the 
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the 
order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which 
the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no 
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days 
after the service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient 
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the 
other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule 
and does not include therein all defenses and objections then available which this rule permits 
to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses 
or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by 
motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of 
failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is 
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except 
(2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, 
if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence 
that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any 
motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this 
state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to 
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furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon 
hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order 
the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such 
costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any 
officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered 
within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter 
an order dismissing the action. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all 
or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted 
or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and 
served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may 
be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered 
upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing 
of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating 
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an 
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to 
which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further 
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
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stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When 
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits 
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the 
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorneys fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
Rule 4-501. Motions, 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and 
documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on dispositive 
motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except proceedings 
before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule does not apply to 
petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
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(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. 
All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a 
memorandum of points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations 
by page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied 
upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as provided in 
paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-
parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state 
the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in excess often 
pages, the application shall include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five 
pages. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. 
The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service 
of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk 
to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph (1 )(D) of this rule. 
(C) Reply memorandum. 
The moving party may serve and file a reply memorandum within five days after service 
of the responding party's memorandum. 
(D) Notice to submit for decision. 
Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file a reply memorandum, either party may 
notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be 
in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." 
The Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion was served, 
the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date the reply 
memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. The 
notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither party files a 
notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
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(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. 
The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with 
a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends 
no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. 
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin 
with a section that contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of 
facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise 
statement of material facts which support the party's contention. Each disputed fact shall 
be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of 
the record upon which the opposing party relies. All material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall 
be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless ordered by the 
court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(B) or (4) below. 
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or any claim in 
the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal 
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a written request for a 
hearing. 
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or opposition 
to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the 
granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided. 
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the requesting party. 
When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify 
the requesting party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule 
the matter for hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, 
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memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the 
motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least two working days 
before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and 
indicate the date and time of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk 
of the court. 
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file their principal 
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled 
trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without leave of the court. 
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file a memorandum 
in opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or the court on its own motion 
may strike the request and decide the motion without oral argument. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. 
Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the court may grant a request for an 
expedited disposition in any case where time is of the essence and compliance with the 
provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise 
significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. 
The court on its own motion or at a party's request may direct arguments of any motion 
by telephone conference without court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of 
all telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
Rule 3.7. Lawyer as witness. 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness except where: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; 
or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. 
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in the trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm 
is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 
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Rule 6. Time 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the 
local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, 
event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. 
The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or 
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed, without 
reference to any additional time provided under subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate 
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court 
an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown 
may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged 
if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as 
extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified 
period pennit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but 
it may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 
60(b), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the doing of any act or the 
taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the continued existence or expiration of 
a term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the 
power of a court to do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action that has been pending 
before it. 
(d) For motions - Affidavits. A written motion, other than one that may be heard ex parte, and 
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before the time specified for 
the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules, or by order of the court. Such an 
order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in 
Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before the hearing, unless the 
court permits them to be served at some other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or is required to do 
some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or 
other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added 
to the end of the prescribed period as calculated under subsection (a). Saturdays, Sundays and 
legal holidays shall be included in the computation of any 3-day period under this subsection, 
except that if the last day of the 3-day period is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the 
period shall run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
Advisory Committee Note: The 2000 amendment attempts to clarify the interplay between Rules 
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6(a) and 6(e) by providing that the three extra days of response time that are added under Rule 
6(e) following service of a paper by mail are not counted when determining whether to exclude 
weekends and holidays from the response time under Rule 6(a). This approach is consistent with 
the approach taken by the majority of federal courts that have interpreted the corresponding 
provisions of Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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